Koen Dijkstra: "Intuition Versus Deliberation: the Role of Information Processing in Judgment and Decision Making"

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Koen Dijkstra: "Intuition Versus Deliberation: the Role of Information Processing in Judgment and Decision Making"

On February 28, 2012 Koen Dijkstra successfully defended the PhD thesis entitled "Intuition Versus Deliberation: the Role of Information Processing in Judgment and Decision Making" at University of Amsterdam.

Promotors
Prof.dr. J. van der Pligt (University of Amsterdam)

Co-promotors
Dr. G.A. van Kleef (University of Amsterdam)


Summary

Traditionally it is thought that the best judgments and decisions are made after a careful analysis of the pros and cons. However, research shows that deliberation can have detrimental effects on judgment and decision making, and that relying on intuition can outperform judgments based on analyses and reasoning. The goal of the current dissertation is to improve our understanding of intuition in judgment and decision-making.
I show that the way we make decisions affects how we attend to and process information, which in turn affects the quality of our judgments and decisions. When we rely on reasons or analyze, we focus on details and possibly ignore other valuable sources of information. When relying on intuition we focus on the global picture and incorporate affective reactions and processing fluency as information in our judgment.
However, preference for particular decision strategies is affected by processing style. A local focus induces a preference for and reliance on deliberation, while a global focus induces a preference for and reliance on intuition. Also, people experience more value of the decision outcome when the strategy they are using fits their current orientation, that is, when they make deliberate decisions in a local focus or intuitive decisions in a global focus.
Furthermore, I show that the effects of relying on intuition or on reasons depend on individuals' knowledge and experience. Judgments and decisions made by novices (individuals low on experience and knowledge) and experts (individuals high on experience and knowledge) are unaffected by judgment mode. Novices perform poorly and experts adequately, irrespective of whether they rely on reasons or on intuition. Intermediates however (those who are high on experience and low on knowledge), benefit from relying on intuition, in comparison to relying on reasons.
In addition I discuss theoretical and practical implications.


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